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Abstract
We consider cloud-based control scenarios in which clients with local control tasks outsource their computational or physical duties to
a cloud service provider. In order to address privacy concerns in such a control architecture, we first investigate the issue of finding an
appropriate privacy measure for clients who desire to keep local state information as private as possible during the control operation.
Specifically, we justify the use of Kramer’s notion of causally conditioned directed information as a measure of privacy loss based on an
axiomatic argument. Then we propose a methodology to design an optimal “privacy filter” that minimizes privacy loss while a given level
of control performance is guaranteed. We show in particular that the optimal privacy filter for cloud-based Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian
(LQG) control can be synthesized by a Linear-Matrix-Inequality (LMI) algorithm. The trade-off in the design is illustrated by a numerical
example.
1 Introduction
Leveraged by cloud computing technologies, the concept
of cloud-based control has attracted much attention from
industry in recent years. Unlike the conventional situation
where local agents are solely responsible for local control
tasks, cloud-based control offers a flexible architecture in
which a third party (i.e., cloud operator) provides control
services (Fig. 1). Advantages of such an architecture include
the following.
(i) The local agent can outsource computational tasks to
the cloud computer.
(ii) Global/shared information available to the cloud can
improve control performances.
(iii) Physical resources needed for control actions can be
provided by the cloud operator.
(iv) New kinds of services become available using data-
mining technologies on large-scale operational data.
Examples of cloud-based control strategies in category (i)
include Model Predictive Control (MPC) of highly complex
plants, where solving large-scale optimization problems in
real-time is a critical requirement. For instance, [20] studies
an MPC-based operation of a large scale solar power plant,
where the benefits of outsourcing computational tasks are
discussed.
A traffic monitoring and management system (e.g., [21]) is
an example of cloud-based control in category (ii). In this
? A preliminary version of this paper will be presented at
ACC2017 [44].
scenario, individual vehicles can be considered as clients,
whose control tasks are to arrive at the destinations effi-
ciently. Since vehicles share a common infrastructure, the
overall control performance is drastically improved by the
existence of a centralized decision coordinator.
Cloud-based control services in category (iii) provide not
only computational services but also physical resources. For
instance, the shared Energy Storage Systems (ESS) for smart
grids [48, 35] can be considered as a cloud-based control
systems in this category. In this example, clients (e.g., indi-
vidual households) with unreliable renewable energy sources
store their excess energy in the shared ESS (operated by
the cloud). While such an architecture is reported to have
cost advantages over distributed ESS systems [35], this in-
troduces new privacy risks since individual power consump-
tion profiles can be observed by the ESS operator. As we
will see, this is an important example of cloud-based control
in which privacy cannot be fully protected by data encryp-
tion due to the actual physical signals involved (e.g., power
consumption).
Finally, category (iv) includes the concept of predictive man-
ufacturing [27]. This is an idea of collecting and analyzing
large amounts of operational data from machines in produc-
tion lines, targeting at improving productivity and safety by
predicting failures before they occur.
1.1 Privacy concerns in cloud-based control
While the concept of cloud-based control enhances conven-
tional control technologies in various ways, it also brings
new risks that did not exist in traditional scenarios. Clearly,
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Fig. 1. Cloud-based control.
careless installation of cloud-based control strategies endan-
gers the clients’ privacy, since the architecture allows the
cloud operator to learn sensitive information belonging to
the clients, from the operational records. Since private in-
formation can be a valuable asset in our modern society, a
reasonable assumption is that the cloud operator is intrinsi-
cally inclined to do so. Hence in this paper, we consider the
cloud operator as a semi-honest (i.e., “honest but curious”)
agent, meaning that it persistently tries to infer the clients’
private information while executing the designated control
algorithm faithfully.
Protecting privacy in cloud-based control requires multiple
layers of data security technologies, such as data encryption
and data perturbation. The latter technology has been ac-
tively studied in the database literature in recent years, where
the trade-off between data utility and privacy with respect to
various metrics (e.g., differential privacy [14], k-anonymity
[40], information theoretic privacy [13]) is thoroughly stud-
ied. However, these privacy metrics were introduced in con-
trol theoretic settings relatively recently ([8] and references
therein), and it is safe to say that privacy concerns in cloud-
based control is an area still in it infancy.
There are several reasons why the existing privacy mecha-
nisms cannot be (and should not be) naively used in cloud-
based control. First, data encryption technologies alone (e.g.,
full or partial homomorphic encryption [25, 16, 38], data ob-
fuscation [45], multi-party computation schemes [12]) may
not be sufficient to protect privacy. Their limitations come
from several reasons, including (i) as of today the computa-
tional requirement for encryption is still far from practical
(e.g., homomorphic encryption [16, 38]), (ii) some encryp-
tion technologies need public keys to be delivered reliably,
but this itself requires separate security guarantees, and (iii)
in some situations the cloud operator inevitably has access to
decrypted/physically meaningful data. To see the last point,
recall the aforementioned shared ESS example, where the
power inflow to an individual household (which contains
sensitive information) is inevitably observable by the ESS
operator. While data encryption cannot be used here, notice
that data perturbation can be applied to physical signals as
well. For instance, battery load hiding (using, e.g., local en-
ergy storage devices [41, 6]) is a data perturbation technique
to enhance smart meter privacy.
Second, privacy notions targeting at single-stage data disclo-
sure mechanisms (which are often the case in the database
literature) are in general not sufficient to accommodate pri-
vacy issues in cloud-based control. A good privacy notion
must respect the fact that privacy leakage occurs over multi-
ple time steps, and the data from the past stored in the cloud
can potentially be used to threaten privacy at the present
time. Also, the existence of information feedback must be
carefully taken into account. Namely, the cloud has certain
influences (through control inputs) on the future private in-
formation (state of client plants), and hence appropriate sta-
tistical conditioning is needed to distinguish private infor-
mation from public information.
Finally, in general, establishing the adequacy of privacy no-
tions (e.g., differential privacy, k-anonymity, information
theoretic privacy) in a particular application (in our case,
cloud-based control) often requires subtle examination of
the context. In fact, many of the available privacy notions
and their validity are sensitive, explicitly or implicitly, to
the problem setting at hand and premises where those no-
tions were originally introduced. For instance, [28] shows by
simple counterexamples that k-anonymity is fragile against
side-information. While differential privacy is shown to be
stronger than information-theoretic privacy in a certain sense
[11], it is also demonstrated in a somewhat different sce-
nario that it does not provide any guarantee in information-
theoretic privacy [13].
To cope with these difficulties, and to embellish privacy dis-
cussions for cloud-based control, this paper introduces an
axiomatic approach to identify an appropriate privacy notion
for cloud-based control. Specifically, we propose a set of
postulates, which is a set of natural properties to be satisfied
by a reasonable notion of privacy in cloud-based control,
and show that a particular function, namely Kramer’s no-
tion of causally conditioned directed information, arises as
a unique candidate. An axiomatic characterization also pro-
vides a convenient interface between the theory and practice
of privacy considerations. As discussed above, it is often dif-
ficult to judge whether a given notion of privacy is appropri-
ate for individual applications. In contrast, axioms are often
easier to discuss in practical contexts. Axioms also provide
a solid mathematical basis on which rigorous theory of pri-
vacy can be developed. As a privacy protection mechanism,
we propose an additional layer (privacy filter) bridging the
cloud and clients, which has a dedicated role to control the
leakage of private data (Fig. 1). We propose joint design
of privacy filter and control algorithms, so that the overall
system is able to balance utility of cloud-based control and
privacy losses (with respect to the derived privacy notion).
1.2 Related work
Privacy has been extensively studied in the database liter-
ature in recent years. While ad hoc approaches for privacy
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(sub-sampling, aggregation, and suppression) have a long
history, one of the first formal definitions of privacy is given
by k-anonymity [40]. Extensions of this notion include t-
closeness and l-diversity [28]. Differential privacy [14] has
been particularly popular since its introduction, partly be-
cause of its convenient property that no prior on the database
content is needed nor used. Information-theoretic privacy in
database is considered in [13] and [37].
Privacy has only relatively recently become a topic of con-
cern in the control-engineering literature. Some of the first
works in the area treated consensus algorithms, and how par-
ticipating agents can maintain some level of privacy despite
sharing information with neighbors, see [22, 29, 31]. Differ-
ential privacy, which was originally developed for database
privacy, can quite generally be adapted to a control-theoretic
context as shown in [33, 47], and also in particular filter-
ing and control applications, e.g., [22, 36, 31, 32]. Based
on game theory, alternative rigorous notions of privacy in a
control and filtering context have been obtained in [1, 15].
A general introduction to information-theoretic security,
secrecy, and privacy can be found in [4]. Information the-
ory has been used to analyze various aspects of privacy in
several different problems settings. The problem of private
information-retrieval [7] was considered for example in
[5] (and references therein). Recent work reported in [39]
introduced the notion of capacity of private information-
retrieval, and characterized corresponding fundamental
bounds. Information-theoretic tools have also been utilized
in the context of differential privacy [2, 3]. Very recent
work summarized in [46] studies the relation between dif-
ferential privacy and privacy quantified in terms of mutual
information. This paper also relates these two notions to
the concept of identifiability. The work reported in [37]
introduced a general framework for establishing a relation
between privacy and utility based on rate–distortion argu-
ments. Similarly, [23] developed analytic tools to support the
characterization of leakage of privacy in biometric systems.
1.3 Contribution of this paper
Contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
(a) We provide a set of postulates (Postulates 1-4) character-
izing basic properties of a privacy measure in cloud-based
control, and show that Kramer’s causally conditioned di-
rected information arises as a unique candidate.
(b) We formulate an optimization problem characterizing op-
timal joint control and privacy filter policies, and derive
its explicit solution in the LQG case.
We note that contribution (a) is crucially dependent on the
recent result [24] where a justification of the logarithmic loss
functions is given via the so-called data-processing axiom.
(Note that such an axiomatic characterization of information
measures has long and rich history [10].) Our contribution is
an extension of [24] to the multi-stage data disclosure mech-
anisms with information feedback, and its re-interpretation
as a privacy axiom.
Notice also that, although we show that the causally condi-
tioned directed information is the only candidate satisfying
the considered set of postulates, we do not claim that the
considered postulates are the only possible characterization
of privacy. In fact, it is our important future work to exam-
ine carefully, possibly using real-world incidents of privacy
attacks, whether the considered privacy postulates are ap-
propriate or not. At the same time it is worth studying how
a different set of postulates leads to a different notion of
privacy.
We also note that axiomatic consistency is not the only cri-
terion that determines usefulness of various privacy notions.
For instance, to design a privacy filter according to our pri-
vacy notion we need to have precise knowledge of the system
model (e.g., distributions of process noises). This is a weak-
ness compared to mechanisms based on differential privacy,
which do not require prior knowledge of the system. 1
1.4 Notation
Random variables are indicated by upper case symbols such
as X . We denote by PX , PX,Y and PX|Y the probability
distribution of X , the joint probability distribution of X and
Y , and the stochastic kernel of X given Y , respectively.
We use notation PX|y to emphasize that it is the condi-
tional probability distribution of X given Y = y. We write
H(X|z) and I(X;Y |z) to denote the entropy and mutual
information evaluated under PX,Y |z , and define conditional
entropy and conditional mutual information by H(X|Z) :=
EPZH(X|z) and I(X;Y |Z) := EPZ I(X;Y |z). If f is a
function of a random variable X , denote by EPXf(X) or
EPXf(x) the mathematical expectation. The cardinality of a
set X is denoted by |X |. A positive definite (resp. semidef-
inite) matrix M is indicated by M  0 (resp. M  0).
2 Problem setting
In this paper, a cloud-based control system is modeled by
a discrete-time nonlinear stochastic control system. We say
that a random variable is public at time t if its realization is
known to the cloud operator at time t. In contrast, by private
random variable at time t, we refer to random variables that
the client wishes to keep confidential (in an appropriate sense
discussed below) at time t. 2 This classification reflects our
premise that the cloud operator is semi-honest. In this paper,
we treat the state sequence Xt , (X1, ..., Xt) of the local
1 On the other hand, in control we often have some prior knowl-
edge of the system, which should be incorporated in the privacy
filter design.
2 According to this definition, note that random variables are
public or private, or neither.
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Fig. 2. Privacy filter: General model.
plant up to time t as the private random variable at time t.
We wish to introduce an appropriate measure of privacy loss
that occurs during the operation of cloud-based control over
a period 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Fig. 2 illustrates the general structure of the class of privacy
filters considered. An output filter prevents raw sensor data to
be disclosed to the cloud. An input privacy filter replaces the
control input Ut with a different value Vt to enhance privacy.
In general, the input and output filters can communicate
with each other via messages Ψt and Φt. Privacy filters and
controller algorithms are in general randomized policies and
have memories of the past observations. Thus, we model
them as stochastic kernels of the forms specified in Fig. 2.
Fig. 3 shows a simpler form of a privacy filter in which the
control input commanded by the cloud is directly applied
to the plant. Since there is no input filter, this architecture
is easier to implement. For the rest of the paper, we focus
on this simple architecture in Fig. 3, and discuss privacy
notions and privacy filter design problems exclusively for
this architecture. In Section 3, we characterize our privacy
notion axiomatically, and then formulate a joint controller
and output privacy filter design problem in Section 4. We
derive an optimal form of joint controller and output privacy
filter in the LQG regime in Section 5.
3 Axiomatic characterization of privacy
A meaningful notion of privacy must satisfy some basic
properties. In this section, we first consider a single-stage
data disclosure mechanism and show that the only candidate
function that satisfies the natural set of postulates (axioms)
is Shannon’s mutual information between private and pub-
lished random variables. Our arguments are aligned with the
development in [24], where mutual information arises as a
unique function that characterizes the value of side informa-
tion in inference problems. The set of axioms used there is
simple, and thus we argue that it can be naturally used as a
set of axioms for privacy. Then, we apply this observation to
multi-stage feedback control systems and show the unique
candidate characterizing privacy loss in cloud-based control
in a satisfactory manner is the causally conditioned directed
information.
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Fig. 3. Privacy filter: Output filter only.
3.1 Single-stage case
Suppose X and Y are X - and Y-valued random variables
with joint distribution PX,Y . We temporarily assume that X
and Y are countable sets, and denote by PX the space of
probability distributions on X . Assuming that X is a private
random variable, we wish to quantify the privacy loss due
to the disclosure of a random variable Y .
First, we quantify the “hardness” of inferringX using the no-
tion of loss function. Generally speaking, a random variable
X is hard to infer if the expected posterior value of observa-
tion (i.e., the degree of “surprise” that occurs when observ-
ing a realization x ∈ X ) cannot be made small. The posterior
value of the observation is a function of the observed real-
ization x ∈ X and a prior distribution QX ∈ PX assumed
by the observer. We refer to such a function ` : X×PX → R
as a loss function. In the literature, it is also called the scor-
ing rule [18] or self-information [30]. Note that for a given
choice of `, the task of inference is to minimize ` by prop-
erly assuming QX . Among many options, the logarithmic
loss function `(x,QX) = log 1QX(x) is frequently used in
the literature. We will motivate this choice later in this paper
(Postulate 2).
Let PX ∈ PX be the true probability distribution of X ,
and QX ∈ PX be the assumed distribution. In general
PX 6= QX . If S(PX , QX) , EPX `(X,QX), the quantity
infQX S(PX , QX) is referred to as the Bayes envelope. A
loss function is said to be proper if infQX S(PX , QX) =
S(PX , PX). It can easily be shown that the logarithmic loss
function is proper, and the associated Bayes envelope coin-
cides with the entropy H(X) of X:
inf
QX
S(PX , QX) = S(PX , PX) = EPX log
1
PX(x)
= H(X).
Now we introduce the first postulate characterizing our pri-
vacy notion. It states that privacy loss due to disclosing Y
is measured by the expected difference in Bayes envelope
evaluated before and after observing Y . Given a loss func-
tion ` and the joint distribution PX,Y , we refer to the privacy
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loss evaluated this way as the privacy leakage function, and
denote it by L(`, PX,Y ).
Postulate 1 The privacy leakage function is in the form
L(`, PX,Y ) =
inf
QX
EPX [`(X,QX)]− EPY inf
QX|Y
EPX|Y [`(X,QX|Y )].
The first term on the right hand side is the Bayes envelope
evaluated without side information Y , while in the second
term, the assumed distribution QX|Y is allowed to depend
on Y . Hence, L(`, PX,Y ) is understood to be the improve-
ment in the estimation quality due to the side information
Y . If the loss function ` is logarithmic, the privacy leakage
function L(`, PX,Y ) defined above coincides with the mu-
tual information between X and Y , i.e.,
L(`, PX,Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = I(X;Y ).
Up to now, the logarithmic loss function is just an example
among many other possible choices of loss functions. It turns
out that it is the only option that satisfies the following
natural postulate.
Postulate 2 (Data-processing axiom [24]) For any distri-
bution PX,Y on X × Y , the information leakage function
L(`, PX,Y ) satisfies
L(`, PT (X),Y ) = L(`, PX,Y ) (1)
for every T : X → X such that T (X) is a sufficient statistic
of X for Y , i.e., the following Markov chains 3 hold:
T (X)–X–Y, X–T (X)–Y. (2)
In (1), the joint distribution PT (X),Y on X ×Y is defined by
PT (X),Y (T (BX )× BY) = PX,Y (BX × BY)
for all subsets BX and BY of X and Y , respectively.
Remark 1 For instance, one can think of X = Rn and T
being a coordinate transformation of X . The identity (1)
then implies that the privacy loss is uniquely defined no mat-
ter what coordinate is chosen to represent private random
variables. Postulate 2 argues that it would be natural to re-
quire (1) for any transformation satisfying (2).
In [24], a weaker axiom with an inequality
L(`, PT (X),Y ) ≤ L(`, PX,Y ) (3)
3 X – Y – Z means that X and Z are conditionally independent
given Y .
is used. However, for our purpose (1) and (3) are equivalent,
and have the same consequences. Although the requirement
of Postulate 2 seems rather mild, it has strong implications
as summarized by the next theorem.
Theorem 2 (Justification of mutual information [24]) Let
X be a finite set with |X | ≥ 3. Under Postulate 2, the pri-
vacy leakage function is uniquely determined by the mutual
information
L(`, PX,Y ) = I(X;Y )
up to a positive multiplicative factor.
PROOF. A complete proof is given in [24]. Notice that the
steps in which the inequality version of the axiom (3) is
used (namely, equations (24) and (80) in [24]) can also be
established by the equality version of the axiom (1).
Remark 3 The result of Theorem 2 can be extended to the
case with continuous random variables X and Y using the
formula [17, Ch. 2.5], [34, Ch. 3.5],[19, Ch. 7.1]:
I(X;Y ) = sup I([X], [Y ]). (4)
The right-hand-side of (4) denotes the supremum of mu-
tual information between discrete random variables [X] and
[Y ] over all finite quantizations. If we consider a supre-
mum achieving sequence of quantizers, and require the data-
processing axiom to be satisfied by each element of the se-
quence, we obtain I(X;Y ) as the unique privacy leakage
function for continuous random variables X and Y .
3.2 Multi-stage case
Based on the single-stage discussion in the previous section,
in this section we propose a multi-stage privacy measure
suitable for cloud-based control (Fig. 3). To proceed, we
introduce the following additional postulates.
Postulate 3 The private random variable at time t is Xt,
while Y t−1 and U t−1 are public at time t.
We first characterize the instantaneous privacy loss at time
step t due to the disclosure of Yt. By Postulate 3, we need
to characterize the privacy leakage function for Xt due to
disclosing Yt under the joint distribution PXt,Yt|yt−1,ut−1 .
Notice that, by Postulate 3, yt−1 and ut−1 are public knowl-
edge.
Let ` be a loss function as in the preceding subsection. For
every realization (yt−1, ut−1), Postulate 2 requires the pri-
vacy leakage function L(`, PXt,Yt|yt−1,ut−1) to satisfy
L(`, PT (Xt),Yt|yt−1,ut−1) = L(`, PXt,Yt|yt−1,ut−1)
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whenever T (Xt) ∈ X t is a sufficient statistic of Xt for Yt
given Y t−1 = yt−1 and U t−1 = ut−1, i.e., the following
Markov chains hold under PXt,Yt|yt−1,ut−1 :
T (Xt)–Xt–Yt, Xt–T (Xt)–Yt.
From Theorem 2, we conclude that the only loss function
(up to positive multiplicative factors) that satisfies the above
equality is the logarithmic one, and with necessity we have
L(`, PXt,Yt|yt−1,ut−1) = I(X
t;Yt|yt−1, ut−1).
Thus, if Y t−1 andU t−1 have a joint distribution PY t−1,Ut−1 ,
the expected privacy loss at time step t is
EPY t−1,Ut−1L(`, PXt,Yt|yt−1,ut−1) = I(X
t;Yt|Y t−1, U t−1).
Finally, we assume that our privacy notion satisfies the fol-
lowing natural property.
Postulate 4 The expected total privacy loss over the horizon
t = 1, 2, ..., T has a stage-additive form over the expected
instantaneous privacy losses.
Under Postulate 4, the expected total privacy loss is
T∑
t=1
I(Xt;Yt|Y t−1, U t−1) =: I(XT → Y T ‖UT−1). (5)
The notation on the right hand side of (5) is introduced in
[26]. We refer to this quantity as Kramer’s causally condi-
tioned directed information. Thus, we obtain:
Proposition 4 Under Postulates 1-4, Kramer’s causally
conditioned directed information I(XT → Y T ‖UT−1)
is the only function (up to positive multiplicative factors)
quantifying the expected privacy loss in the cloud-based
control in Fig. 3.
4 Privacy-preserving cloud-based control design
Suppose that the performance of the cloud-based control
system is measured by a stage-wise additive cost function∑T
t=1 Ec(Xt+1, Ut). Then, privacy loss in cloud-based con-
trol with a given control performance requirement δ is min-
imized by solving
min I(XT → Y T ‖UT−1) (6a)
s.t.
T∑
t=1
Ec(Xt+1, Ut) ≤ δ. (6b)
Likewise, the best achievable control performance under the
privacy constraint is characterized by flipping the constraint
and objective functions in (6). In both cases, the optimization
domain is the space of the sequence of Borel measurable
stochastic kernels
D = {PUt|Y t,Ut−1 , PYt|Y t−1,Ut−1,Zt}Tt=1 (7)
characterizing joint controller and output privacy filter poli-
cies. 4 Since (6) is an infinite dimensional optimization prob-
lem, it is in general difficult to obtain an explicit form of an
optimal solution. In Section 5, we consider a special case
in which it is possible. For the later use, we next present a
fundamental inequality showing that the privacy leakage is
at least I(XT → UT ) := ∑Tt=1 I(Xt;Ut|U t−1).
Lemma 5 For all joint controller and output privacy filter
policies in (7), we have
I(XT → UT ) ≤ I(XT → Y T ‖UT−1).
PROOF. The inequality is directly verified as follows.
I(XT → Y T ‖UT−1)− I(XT → UT )
=
∑T
t=1
[
I(Xt;Yt|Y t−1, U t−1)− I(Xt;Ut|U t−1)
]
(a)
=
∑T
t=1
[
I(Xt;Yt, Ut|Y t−1, U t−1)− I(Xt;Ut|U t−1)
]
(b)
=
∑T
t=1
[
I(Xt;Y t|U t)− I(Xt;Y t−1|U t−1)]
(c)
=
∑T
t=1
[
I(Xt;Y t|U t)− I(Xt−1;Y t−1|U t−1)]
(d)
=I(XT ;Y T |UT ) ≥ 0.
Equality (a) holds since I(Xt;Yt, Ut|Y t−1, U t−1) =
I(Xt;Yt|Y t−1, U t−1) + I(Xt;Ut|Y t, U t−1), and the sec-
ond term is zero since Xt and Ut are conditionally inde-
pendent given (Y t, U t−1). To see (b), apply the chain rule
for the mutual information in two different ways:
I(Xt;Y t, Ut|U t−1)
= I(Xt;Y t−1|U t−1) + I(Xt;Yt, Ut|Y t−1, U t−1)
= I(Xt;Ut|U t−1) + I(Xt;Y t|U t).
Equality (c) holds as I(Xt;Y t−1) = I(Xt−1;Y t−1|U t−1)+
I(Xt;Y
t−1|Xt−1, U t−1), and the second term is zero
since Xt and Y t−1 are conditionally independent given
(Xt−1, U t−1). Finally, telescoping cancellations of terms
show (d).
So far we have provided a justification of I(XT →
Y T ‖UT−1) as a measure of privacy loss. Next, we dis-
cuss how this quantity imposes a fundamental limitation in
estimating private random variables.
4 We consider PU1|Y 1,U0 = PU1|Y 1 and PY1|Y 0,U0,Z1 =
PY1|Z1 .
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4.1 Implication via distortion-rate function
Consider an optimal joint controller and output privacy filter
policy solving (6), and let γ be the optimal value. By Postu-
late 4, the total privacy loss γ can be written as γ =
∑T
t=1 γt,
where
γt = I(X
t;Yt|Y t−1, U t−1) (≥ 0) (8)
is the privacy loss at time t. To see how (8) guarantees
privacy against inferring Xt at time t even after disclosing
Yt, consider an estimate of Xt of the form Xˆt : Yt ×
U t−1 → X t. Since realizations of Y t−1 and U t−1 are prior
knowledge at time t, Xˆt can be viewed as a function of Yt
alone, and thus Xt – Yt – Xˆt forms a Markov chain given
(Y t−1, U t−1). By the data-processing inequality,
I(Xt; Xˆt|Y t−1, U t−1) ≤ I(Xt;Yt|Y t−1, U t−1) = γt.
In other words, the expected mutual information between
Xt and Xˆt is bounded by γt:
EPY t−1,Ut−1 I(X
t; Xˆt|yt−1, ut−1) ≤ γt. (9)
This inequality imposes a fundamental limitation of estima-
tion accuracy in the following sense. Let ρt : X t × X t →
[0,∞) be an arbitrary distortion function. For a given source
distribution PXt|yt−1,ut−1 , let Dt : [0,∞) → [0,∞) be the
distortion-rate function [9]. By definition of the distortion-
rate function, for any joint distribution PXt,Xˆt|yt−1,ut−1 , we
have
EPXt,Xˆt|yt−1,ut−1ρt(X
t, Xˆt) ≥ Dt(I(Xt; Xˆt|yt−1, ut−1)).
Taking expectation with respect to PY t−1,Ut−1 , we have
Eρt(Xt, Xˆt) ≥ EPY t−1,Ut−1Dt(I(Xt; Xˆt|yt−1, ut−1))
(a)
≥ Dt(EPY t−1,Ut−1 I(Xt; Xˆt|yt−1, ut−1))
(b)
≥ Dt(γt).
Recall that distortion-rate functions are in general convex
and non-increasing [9, Lemma 10.4.1]. Thus, (a) follows
from Jensen’s inequality, and (b) follows from (9). Hence,
under our privacy notion, (8) ensures that the estimation error
corresponding to any estimator Xˆt based on all information
available in the cloud at time t cannot be smaller than the
distortion-rate function Dt(γt).
4.2 Implication via Fano’s inequality
Suppose that Xt is a countable space for each t = 1, 2, ..., T .
If we define t , Pr(Xt 6= Xˆt) under a joint distribution
PXt,Xˆt|yt−1,ut−1 , by Fano’s inequality [9], we have
t log(|X t| − 1) + h(t)
≥ H(Xt|Xˆt, yt−1, ut−1)
= H(Xt|yt−1, ut−1)− I(Xt; Xˆt|yt−1, ut−1)
where h() = − log  − (1 − ) log(1 − ). Taking the
expectation with respect to PY t−1,Ut−1 ,
E(t) log(|X t| − 1) + h(E(t))
≥ E(t) log(|X t| − 1) + E(h(t))
≥ EH(Xt|yt−1, ut−1)− EI(Xt; Xˆt|yt−1, ut−1)
where we used Jensen’s inequality in the first step. Thus,
from (9), we obtain
E(t) log(|X t|− 1) +h(E(t)) ≥ H(Xt|Y t−1, U t−1)−γt.
This inequality clearly illustrates how the average proba-
bility of error is prevented from taking on small values
by the randomness introduced, on average, when mapping
(Y t−1, U t−1) to Xt, as characterized by the conditional en-
tropy H(Xt|Y t−1, U t−1). The only way that the error prob-
ability can be allowed to become small is to counteract the
growing uncertainty by increasing the value for γt, which
illustrates how γt captures loss of privacy by opening up for
improved estimation of Xt based on (yt−1, ut−1).
5 LQG case
In this section, we consider a special case in which (6) be-
comes a tractable optimization problem. Suppose the plant
in Fig. 3 is a fully observable linear dynamical system
Xt+1 = AtXt +BtUt +Wt, Zt = Xt
where Wt ∼ N (0,ΣWt ) is a sequence of independent Gaus-
sian random variables. We assume ΣWt  0 for t = 1, ..., T .
Assume also that c(·, ·) in (6) is a convex quadratic function,
and that the problem (6) can be written as
min I(XT → Y T ‖UT−1) (10a)
s.t.
T∑
t=1
E(‖Xt+1‖2Qt + ‖Ut‖2Rt) ≤ δ. (10b)
The domain of optimization is (7). 5 In what follows, we
provide an optimal joint controller and output privacy filter
policy that solves (10).
5 Problem (10) is identical to the problem considered in [43],
except that in [43], an optimal solution is provided under the
restriction that the stochastic kernels in (7) are Linear-Gaussian.
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Fig. 4. Structure of optimal policy for problem (11).
First, in view of Lemma 5, notice that the minimum pri-
vacy leakage characterized by (10) is lower bounded by the
optimal value of
min I(XT → UT ) (11a)
s.t.
T∑
t=1
E(‖Xt+1‖2Qt + ‖Ut‖2Rt) ≤ δ (11b)
where again the domain of optimization is D given by (7).
A related optimization problem to (11) is already considered
in [42], where the only difference is that the optimization
domain considered there is D′ , {PUt|Xt,Ut−1}Tt=1. Notice
that D ⊂ D′ since every element in D can be, by compo-
sitions of stochastic kernels, mapped to an element of D′.
In [42], it is shown that the optimal solution PUt|Xt,Ut−1 in
D′ can be realized by the interconnection of a linear sensor,
Kalman filter, and a controller as shown in Fig. 4. Matrix
parameters such as Ct, ΣVt , Lt, Kt for t = 1, ..., T must be
optimally tuned, which can be achieved by an LMI algorithm
(Algorithm 1). Notice that in the second step of Algorithm 1,
a convex optimization problem must be solved. Since it is in
the form of the determinant maximization problem, a stan-
dard semidefinite programming solver can be used.
For the purpose of our present study, notice that the linear
sensor mechanism in Fig. 4 can be interpreted as an output
privacy filter, while the Kalman filter and the controller can
be implemented by the cloud operator (Fig. 5). In other
words, a realization of PUt|Xt,Ut−1 shown in Fig. 4 can be
viewed as an element of D. Now we claim the following.
Lemma 6 The policy shown in Fig. 4, which is an optimal
solution to (11), is also an optimal solution to (10).
PROOF. Since I(XT → UT ) ≤ I(XT → Y T ‖UT−1) by
Lemma 5, it is sufficient to show that
I(XT → UT ) = I(XT → Y T ‖UT−1) (12)
holds for the optimal solution (11) shown in Fig. 4. For
the ease of presentation, we shown (12) under the assump-
tion that Kt, t = 1, ..., T are invertible. Although such an
assumption is unnecessary, the proof in full generality is
lengthy and must be differed to [42, equation (22)].
Due to the invertibility of Kt, t = 1, ..., T , random variables
U t and Xˆt appearing in Fig. 4 are related by an invertible
linear map. Since Ct, t = 1, ..., T are full row rank matrices
by construction, the Kalman filter
Xˆt = (I − LtCt)(At−1Xˆt−1 +Bt−1Ut−1) + LtYt
has a causal inverse
Yt = L
†
tXˆt + L
†
t(LtCt − I)(At−1Xˆt−1 +Bt−1Ut−1)
where L†t , (L>t Lt)−1L>t . Thus, Xˆt and Y t are related
by an invertible linear map. Therefore, U t and Y t are
related by an invertible linear map. (They contain statisti-
cally equivalent information.) In particular, this implies that
conditional differential entropies h(Xt|Y t−1, U t−1) and
h(Xt|Y t, U t−1) are equal to h(Xt|U t−1) and h(Xt|U t),
respectively. Therefore,
I(XT → Y T ‖UT−1)
=
∑T
t=1
I(Xt;Yt|Y t−1, U t−1)
=
∑T
t=1
[
h(Xt|Y t−1, U t−1)− h(Xt|Y t, U t−1)]
=
∑T
t=1
[
h(Xt|U t−1)− h(Xt|U t)]
=
∑T
t=1
I(Xt;Ut|U t−1)
= I(XT → UT ).
In summary, we have an explicit form of the joint control
and output privacy filter policy solving (10).
Proposition 7 An optimal joint controller and output pri-
vacy filter characterized by an optimal solution to (10) is
in the form shown in Fig. 5. An optimal choice of matrices
Ct, ΣVt , Lt (Kalman gains) and Kt (feedback control gains)
are obtained by Algorithm 1. Moreover, the optimal value of
(10) is equal to the optimal value of the determinant maxi-
mization problem in Algorithm 1.
Notice that the privacy filter shown in Fig. 5 is similar to
privacy protecting mechanisms considered in various other
contexts (e.g., [14]) in that it is adding noise Vt before dis-
closing data. Proposition 7 shows that the optimal noise dis-
tribution is Gaussian in the LQG case (10).
6 Numerical example
In this section, we consider a simple scalar system
Xt+1 = Xt + Ut +Wt, t = 1, ..., T
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Algorithm 1 Joint controller and privacy filter design for
cloud-based LQG control
1. Determine feedback control gains Kt via the backward
Riccati recursion:
St =
{
Qt if t = T
Qt + Φt+1 if t = 1, · · · , T − 1
Φt = A
>
t (St − StBt(B>t StBt +Rt)−1B>t St)At
Kt = −(B>t StBt +Rt)−1B>t StAt
2. Solve a determinant maximization problem with respect to
Pt|t  0,Πt  0, t = 1, ..., T subject to LMI constraints:
min
1
2
∑T
t=1
log det Π−1t + c1
s.t.
∑T
t=1
Tr(ΘtPt|t) + c2 ≤ D,
P1|1  P1|0, PT |T = ΠT ,
Pt+1|t+1  AtPt|tA>t + ΣWt , t = 1, ..., T − 1[
Pt|t−Πt Pt|tA>t
AtPt|t AtPt|tA>t +Σ
W
t
]
0, t = 1, ..., T − 1
where Θt = K>t (B
>
t StBt +Rt)Kt, t = 1, ..., T and
c1 =
1
2 log detP1|0 +
1
2
∑T−1
t=1
log det ΣWt
c2 = Tr(N1P1|0) +
∑T
t=1
Tr(ΣWt St).
3. For each t = 1, ..., T , choose (e.g., by the singular value
decomposition) a full row rank matrix Ct and a positive
definite matrix ΣVt such that
C>t Σ
V
t
−1
Ct = P
−1
t|t − (At−1Pt−1|t−1A>t−1 + ΣWt−1)−1.
4. Determine the Kalman gains by
Lt = Pt|t−1C>t (CtPt|t−1C
>
t + Σ
V
t )
−1
where Pt+1|t = AtPt|tA>t + Σ
W
t .
with a process noise Wt ∼ N (0, 0.3). This example is mo-
tivated by a cloud-based navigation service, where the state
variable Xt is interpreted as the position of the client at time
t, whereas Ut is the navigation signal provided by the cloud.
Assuming the initial position is X1 = 15, the cloud-based
controller navigates the client to the origin withing T = 40
steps using the output of a privacy filter
Yt = CtXt + Vt, Vt ∼ N (0,ΣVt ).
Controller  𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 = 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡𝔼𝔼(𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡|𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡) 
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Fig. 5. Structure of the optimal joint controller and output privacy
filter for the cloud-based LQG control problem (10). Although the
output privacy filter is allowed to utilize public random variable
U t−1 (as shown in Fig. 3), it turns out that this information need
not be used.
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Fig. 6. SNR of the optimal privacy filter and the privacy loss.
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Fig. 7. Simulated trajectory of Xt and its estimate E(Xt|Y t).
The optimal privacy filter is different depending on the
choice of δ in (10). We consider two scenarios in which
control requirements are stringent (δ = 24.4) and mild
(δ = 31.4). In both cases, we use the same control cost
function with Qt = 1, Rt = 10 for all t. The former
case requires higher data rate (measured in directed in-
formation). In each scenario, we compute the optimal se-
quence {Ct,ΣVt }t=1,...,40 by solving (10) using semidef-
inite programming. The sequence of signal-to-noise ratios
SNRt = C2t /Σ
V
t is plotted in Fig. 6 (a). The total loss of
privacy in the high rate scenario is 71.5 [bits] (the area of
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blue region in Fig. 6 (b)) while it is 15.4 [bits] in the low
rate case (the area of red region in Fig. 6 (b)). Fig. 7 shows
the closed-loop performance in each scenario. In the high
rate case, the cloud estimates the position of the client accu-
rately, and consequently the control performance is better.
In the low rate case, the estimate is not accurate (privacy is
better protected) so the control performance is poor.
7 Summary and future work
In this paper, we showed that Kramer’s causally conditioned
directed information arises as the unique candidate (up to
positive multiplicative factor) for a measure of privacy loss
in cloud-based control if Postulates 1-4 (including the data-
processing axiom [24]) are to be satisfied. Our result is a
first step towards a complete axiomatic privacy theory in net-
worked control, which we see as a promising approach that
provides a convenient interface between theory and practice.
There are numerous further opportunities along the same
line of research. Notice that the set of postulates we have se-
lected in this paper is not the only possible characterization
of privacy. In fact, in [13], the “maximum” type of privacy
leakage function
L(`, PX,Y ) =
inf
QX
EPX [`(X,QX)]−min
y∈Y
inf
QX|Y
EPX|Y [`(X,QX|Y )].
is considered in parallel with the “average” type of privacy
leakage function we assumed in Postulate 1. It is of great
interest whether there exists a valid notion of privacy satis-
fying the corresponding new set of postulates.
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